Promoting reconciliation in separatist conflict: The effect of morality framing

Ali Mashuri¹ and Esther van Leeuwen²

Abstract
In separatist conflict, the majority group and the separatist group alternate in their roles as victim and perpetrator. We examined how framing prior ingroup wrongdoings in terms of violations of moral ideals or violations of moral obligations affects the majority’s willingness to reconcile with the separatist group. We conducted a field experiment (N = 208) in the Republic of Indonesia, where separatist conflict is rife. As expected, among members of the majority who were high in national identification, a moral ideals violation frame produced stronger positive intergroup orientations (e.g., perspective-taking, intergroup trust) and collective emotions of guilt and shame, whereas a moral obligations violation frame produced stronger positive intergroup orientations and collective emotions among low identifiers. In turn, positive intergroup orientations and collective emotions promoted reconciliatory attitudes (e.g., willingness to apologise, support for intergroup cooperation). These findings suggest that policymakers can gain a better insight into the effect of framing ingroup wrongdoings as violations of either moral ideals or moral obligations when taking national identification into account.

Keywords
group identification, ingroup wrongdoings, morality framing, reconciliation, separatist conflict

Separatist conflict poses a challenge to nations because of its oftentimes violent nature and high material and human costs (Walter, 2009). Policymakers are therefore calling for social interventions that can promote peace and reconciliation in separatist conflict (Al Qurtuby, 2015). Despite this pressing need, there is a remarkable shortage of empirical research that looks into factors that can facilitate reconciliation in separatist conflict—and even more so regarding factors that can form a basis for social intervention. To fill this gap, the current study was conducted with the aim of investigating the role of morality framing (Does et al., 2011) in promoting reconciliatory tendencies. In doing so, we examined how the framing of ingroup wrongdoings in the history of separatist conflict as either a violation of moral ideals or a violation of moral obligations

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would affect positive intergroup orientations and collective emotions of guilt and shame, depending on the level of national identification. The contextual background we used to test these ideas is West Papua, Indonesia, where separatist tensions are fraught (Davidson, 2019).

West Papua has been integrated into Indonesia through the Act of Free Choice in 1969 (Drooglever, & van Yperen, 2009). However, the legitimacy and legality of this act have been questioned by many West Papuans, spurring their demand for separation from the republic (Saltford, 2003). Factors such as exploitation of natural resources and military suppression in West Papua strengthened the secessionist claim, which renders this issue an unresolved national problem (MacLeod, 2015).

We focused our attention on members of the nonseparatist Indonesian majority (henceforth referred to as “the majority”) because this group tends to exercise stronger military and political powers than the separatist group. Moreover, majority groups are commonly expected to take the moral high ground in conflict situations and initiate reconciliation processes (Vandello et al., 2011). Intervention programs therefore stand a better chance of being successful when aimed at members of the majority.

The Moral Side of Separatist Conflict

Separatist conflict involves a strong moral component. Morality communicates what is right or wrong, just or unjust in human behaviour (Haidt & Graham, 2007). In separatist conflict, both the majority and the separatist group typically claim that their actions are morally right and justified, while labelling the other party’s actions as immoral. Separatist groups may feel morally entitled to (violently) oppose their integration into the larger nation because they perceive this integration as inappropriate, illegitimate, or imposed (Tomz, 1994). In contrast, the majority tends to believe in the appropriateness and legitimacy of the integration (Walter, 2009), and construes the separatist group’s stance as a violation of their constitutional laws and its acts of resistance as terrorism, thus legitimising (violent) acts of suppression of the separatist group (Bookman, 1993). As a consequence, the majority and the separatist group often wind up in a mutual cycle of acts of aggression (Webb, 2016).

Since the cycle of aggression that characterises separatist conflict perpetuates because both parties do not construe their acts as wrongdoings—but rather as justified responses to the other party’s wrongful actions—a potentially promising strategy to break this cycle could focus on convincing each party of the immorality of their actions (Čehajić-Clancy & Brown, 2008; Čehajić-Clancy et al., 2011). Previous research conducted in other types of intergroup conflict showed that people who were reminded of their group’s (prior) wrongdoings vis-à-vis another group, experienced increased feelings of collective guilt (Doosje et al., 2006; Zebel et al., 2008) and shame (Gausel et al., 2012; Johns et al., 2005). Such feelings of collective guilt and shame are strongly linked to reconciliatory attitudes, including support for reparative actions or willingness to apologise (Allpress et al., 2010; Brown et al., 2008; Mashuri, van Leeuwen, & Hanurawan, 2018; McGarty et al., 2005; van Leeuwen et al., 2013; Zebel et al., 2009).

The overview of research outlined illuminates an obvious and deceptively simple path towards promoting reconciliation: by reminding people of their ingroup’s wrongdoings. We used the term “deceptive” because there is one major hurdle on the road. Members of perpetrating groups often deny the illegitimacy and harmfulness of their actions when confronted with them, trying to justify them instead (Cohen, 2001). Appeals to ingroup wrongdoings thus hold potential for fostering reconciliation only by finding a way to overcome the defensive reactions to such collective misdeeds (Mashuri, van Leeuwen, & van Vugt, 2018). To this end, we investigated the effect of morality framing in the current research. That is, we confronted participants with previous wrongful acts committed by their majority group against the separatist group, and induced them to think of these acts as either violations of moral ideals or as violations of moral obligations.
Morality Framing

Morality framing has to do with the way in which the harmfulness and injustice of ingroup actions towards another group are highlighted, in an attempt to raise ingroup members’ concerns over the immorality of their actions (Kreps & Monin, 2011; Wolsko et al., 2016). In their study of social equality, Does et al. (2011) made a distinction between a framing of social equality in terms of moral ideals versus a framing in terms of moral obligations. Moral ideals are associated with prescriptive morality, which reflects concerns over what people should do, and are aligned with an approach-orientation tendency (Janoff-Bulman et al., 2009). Moral obligations are associated with proscriptive morality (Does et al., 2011), which reflects concerns over what people should not do, and are aligned with an avoidance-orientation tendency. Moral ideals thus motivate people to achieve positive outcomes that connote rewards, goals, incentives, and other desirable end-states. In contrast, moral obligations make people more sensitive to negative outcomes that connote punishments, conflicts, and other undesirable end-states (Does et al., 2011).

Does et al. (2012) observed that research participants who were encouraged to frame social equality as a moral ideal (i.e., achieving the ideals of promoting social equality among people with different ethnic backgrounds) tended to view this as a challenge rather than as a threat, whereas participants who viewed social equality as a moral obligation (i.e., meeting the obligations of promoting social equality among people with different ethnic backgrounds) tended to experience this as threatening, as opposed to challenging. In another study, Does et al. (2011) found that framing existing structural equality in terms of moral ideals, compared to framing it in terms of moral obligations, promoted support for reparative actions on behalf of a disadvantaged group.

In the present research, we reasoned that morality framing can impact the way majority members respond to reminders of ingroup wrongdoings in the context of separatist conflict. Gausel and Leach (2011) argued that being reminded of the ingroup’s immoral actions can trigger support for reconciliation, especially when the perpetrating group is provided with opportunities to take concrete action to this end. Furthermore, van der Toorn et al. (2015) found that participants who were persuaded to take actions to improve the ingroup’s moral conduct reported less rationalisation of ingroup misdeeds and increased feelings of collective guilt, compared to participants who were persuaded to avoid ingroup misconduct.

The Moderating Role of National Identification

Because of their respective associations with positive or negative consequences, we argue that a framing of ingroup wrongdoings in terms of a violation of moral ideals is less likely to cause resistance and denial of ingroup harm than a framing in terms of a violation of moral obligations, particularly among high-identifying group members. This is the case because high group identifiers consider the group as a central aspect of their social identity (Costabile & Austin, 2017; Doosje et al., 1998), which motivates them to reject the wrongfulness or immorality of their actions in an attempt to protect their identity (Bilali et al., 2012; Lowery et al., 2007; van Leeuwen et al., 2013; Zebel et al., 2009). Low identifiers, on the other hand, tend to adopt a more practical stance and attempt to repair their group’s wrongdoings (Doosje et al., 2006; Klein et al., 2011). This is because low identifiers, by virtue of their group membership, are still implicated by their group’s reputation even when they do not feel strongly attached to their group (van Leeuwen et al., 2013).

Support for the moderating role of identification can be found in research by van Leeuwen et al. (2013, Study 2). They observed that high-identifying group members were more willing to help a victimised outgroup than low identifiers when appealed to their feelings of collective pride over their historical positive treatment of this
group. However, when appealed to their feelings of collective guilt over the ingroup's maltreatment of this outgroup, high identifiers were less willing to help the outgroup than low identifiers. Van Leeuwen et al. (2013) argued that high identifiers respond so well to appeals of collective pride because they are motivated to associate positive outcomes with the ingroup, while negative outcomes are discarded. Low identifiers, on the other hand, are less defensive about such negative outcomes, which increases the odds that they accept these outcomes and attempt to restore them.

Applying these findings to the current research, we argued that, in the context of separatist conflict, a confrontation with ingroup wrongdoings while primed with a violation of moral ideals mindset should be more conducive to positive intergroup orientations and collective emotions among high identifiers than among low identifiers (Hypothesis 1a). A confrontation with ingroup wrongdoings while primed with a violation of moral obligations mindset, on the other hand, should promote low identifiers’ positive intergroup orientations and collective emotions more than those of high identifiers (Hypothesis 1b).

Reconciliation in Separatist Conflict

Separatist conflict is considered one of the more violent and protracted types of intergroup conflict (Walter, 2009), fuelling anger and revenge as well as prejudice and distrust (Bruneau & Saxe, 2012; Halperin, 2011). Reconciliation in such conflict requires the development of constructive emotions (e.g., collective guilt and shame, empathy) and cognitive orientations (e.g., positive intergroup attitudes, intergroup trust; Kelman, 2006; Nadler, 2002). Capturing these multifaceted aspects of reconciliation, we assessed reconciliatory attitudes and intentions in the current study. Previous research within the context of separatist conflict (Mashuri, van Leeuwen, & Hanurawan, 2018), building upon the theory of planned behaviour (TPB; Ajzen, 1991; Moons & De Pelsmacker, 2015), showed that reconciliatory attitudes are the most proximal predictor of reconciliatory intentions, and that they mediate the effect of positive intergroup orientations and collective emotions on reconciliatory intentions. We therefore predicted that reconciliatory attitudes would mediate the effect of positive intergroup orientations and collective emotions on reconciliatory intentions (Hypothesis 2).

Method

Participants and Design

Participants were 208 Javanese women ($M_{\text{age}} = 40.84$, $SD_{\text{age}} = 8.58$) who took part in the study in exchange for a small fee. Participants (all nonstudents) were members of a large Islamic organisation in Central Java, Indonesia. Despite its religious orientation, the organisation has national and nonpolitical missions, and it supports the Indonesian secular national ideology. Participants were recruited from two branches of the mass organisation.2 Using a field experiment, we randomly assigned each of the two branches to one of two conditions: moral ideals violation ($n = 101$) and moral obligations violation ($n = 107$).

Procedure and Measures

Prior to the experiment, invitation letters were distributed to members of three branches of the organisation. Signed by the leader of the mass organisation, the letters informed members that research participation involved watching a documentary about how the Indonesian government has treated indigenous West Papuans. The letters also described the location, estimated duration, as well incentive paid by the research. Of the 211 members who received the invitation letter, 208 (98.58%) took part in the research. This high response rate, which is presumably attributable to the fact that the organisation's leader supported the study, ensures the virtual absence of nonresponse bias.
The research was carried out in a room inside the central office building of the organisation, which can accommodate a maximum of 200 participants. Upon reading and signing informed consent, participants were handed a questionnaire. Unless otherwise indicated, answers were assessed on 5-point scales (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree). Scales were created by averaging participants’ responses to the items. The questionnaire commenced with eight items to assess national identification (e.g., “Being an Indonesian is an important part of my identity”; α = .80), adapted from Roccas et al. (2006). Participants were then presented with a documentary.

The documentary, which lasted 22 minutes, featured clips and commentary about how the Indonesian government’s actions had affected West Papuans with respect to five themes, derived from previous research (Mashuri, van Leeuwen, & van Vugt, 2018). These five themes included economic underdevelopment, social and political injustice, militaristic-repressive approach, exploitation of natural resources, and human resource underdevelopment. In the documentary, a professional newscaster narrated the clips about the five themes and described how each set of actions occurred in the past and continue in the present, along with their harmful impacts on West Papuans. The documentary also included sections of an interview between the newscaster and the leader of the participants’ organisation. The leader described how the various governmental actions featured in the documentary had violated either moral ideals (i.e., achieving the ideals of promoting peace and reconciliation) or moral obligations (i.e., meeting the obligations of promoting peace and reconciliation).

After watching the documentary, participants were asked to take some time to think about it and to briefly describe its central message. They were then instructed to read a short text which was used to manipulate morality framing. This manipulation was based on Does et al. (2011), with two modifications. First, the focus of morality framing was on ingroup wrongdoings instead of social equality. Second, the morality framing construed ingroup wrongdoings as a violation of moral ideals or a violation of moral obligations instead of moral ideals or moral obligations per se. To induce a moral ideals violation framing, participants in this condition were asked to write down at least four concrete examples of their possible actions and decisions that could achieve the ideal of promoting peace and reconciliation between themselves and indigenous West Papuans. To induce a moral obligations violation framing, participants in this condition were asked to list at least four concrete examples of their possible actions and decisions that could meet the obligation of promoting peace and reconciliation between themselves and indigenous West Papuans.

In addition to a violation of moral ideals and a violation of moral obligations, the study also included a control condition in which participants were not reminded of any ingroup wrongdoing, and did not receive morality framing instructions (n = 108). Existing literature (e.g., Nadler et al., 2008; Nadler & Shnabel, 2015) and anecdotal records (Starzyk et al., 2009) suggest that intergroup reconciliation in part requires that the wrongdoings the perpetrating group has inflicted upon the victim group be actively addressed, as was the case in the moral ideals and moral obligations violation conditions. We therefore opted not to include the control condition in the analyses reported here, as this condition connotes no actions within the context of intergroup reconciliation. However, Supplemental Materials 2 and 3A are provided to show the results of structural models in which the control condition was taken into account.

Participants were then asked to complete the remainder of the questionnaire. Intergroup trust (seven items; e.g., “Indigenous Papuans generally have good intentions”; α = .74) was adapted from Mutz and Reeves (2005); positive attitudes (four items; e.g., “I enjoy interacting with indigenous Papuans”; α = .72) was adapted from Duckitt (2006); and positive stereotypes (four items; e.g., “Indigenous Papuans are generous”; α = .84) was adapted from Stephan et al. (2002). Perspective-taking was assessed with three items.
(e.g., “I can empathise with what West Papuans have experienced”; $\alpha = .75$) adapted from Andrighetto et al. (2012). These four measures were combined into a single construct of positive intergroup orientations. Collective guilt (four items; e.g., “I feel guilty about the harm done by the Indonesian military to Papuans”; $\alpha = .90$) was adapted from Wohl and Branscombe (2005), whereas collective shame (five items; e.g., “It makes me feel ashamed when I see an international report on the treatment of Papuans by the Indonesian military”; $\alpha = .88$) was adapted from Čehajić-Clancy and Brown (2008). Collective guilt and collective shame were combined into a single construct of collective emotions.

The questionnaire continued with a measure of the willingness to apologise (four items; e.g., “I think that the Indonesian government should officially acknowledge their fault in mistreating the Papuans in the past”; $\alpha = .80$) adapted from McGarty et al. (2005). Support for intergroup cooperation was assessed with four items (e.g., “Cooperation with the Papuans is the key to United Nation of Indonesia’s success”; $\alpha = .79$) adapted from Scott et al. (2003). Support for affirmative action was assessed with six items (e.g., “A certain quota of Papuans, even if not all of them are fully qualified, should be admitted to colleges and universities in Indonesia”; $\alpha = .72$) adapted from Swim and Miller (1999). These three measures were combined into a single construct of reconciliatory attitudes. Reconciliatory intentions were assessed with five items asking participants to what extent they were willing to engage in a number of actions within the next 6 months (e.g., “Donating blood to indigenous Papuans inside or outside Papua who are in need”; $\alpha = .78$), developed by the authors. Upon finishing the questionnaire, participants were asked to report their age and gender, and were debriefed, thanked, and paid.4

Results

Manipulation Checks

To check the effectiveness of the moral framing manipulation, we followed the same procedure as Does et al. (2011). Two independent coders who were blind to the hypotheses and experimental condition scored participants’ listed actions in response to the morality framing instructions. Responses were coded into three categories: the “do’s” (i.e., actions or decisions to achieve peace and reconciliation), the “don’ts” (i.e., actions or decisions to avoid conflict and violence), and the uncategorised (i.e., actions or decisions that do not reflect the “do’s” or the “don’ts”). An example of participants’ “do” responses is: “I would like to maintain a friendly communication with West Papuans.” An example of a “don’t” response is: “I would like to insist the Indonesian government to cease its violent acts against West Papuans.” An example of an uncategorised response is: “I love the United Nation of Indonesia.” The interrater reliabilities were good (“do’s”: kappa = .76, $p < .001$; “don’ts”: kappa = .81, $p < .001$; uncategorised: kappa = .66, $p < .001$).

We then examined the extent to which morality framing affected the nature of participants’ motivational strategies (i.e., approach vs. avoidance) instead of the quantity of their motivational strategies (i.e., the number of “do’s” and “don’ts”). Inspection of multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) demonstrates that the effect of morality framing on the quantity of the motivational strategies was not significant, meaning that the number of reported “do’s” and “don’ts” was statistically the same in the moral ideals violation condition and the moral obligations violation condition (both $ps > .05$). However, as expected, the chi-square test of independence reveals that morality framing significantly affected the nature of the motivational strategies. In particular, we found that significantly more participants in the moral ideals violation condition (48%) reported “do’s” than participants in the moral obligations violation condition (38%), Pearson $\chi^2 (1, 208) = 27.32$, $p < .001$. In contrast, significantly more participants in the moral obligations violation condition (38%) reported “don’ts” than participants in the moral ideals violation condition (21%), Pearson $\chi^2 (1, 208) = 19.63$, $p < .001$.5 Taken together, these
findings indicate that the manipulation of morality framing was successful.

**Hypothesis Testing**

Table 1 reports bivariate correlations between national identification, morality framing, and their interaction term with positive intergroup orientations, collective emotions, reconciliatory attitudes, and reconciliatory intentions. National identification was significantly correlated with the reconciliatory tendency measures, but morality framing did not correlate with any of the reconciliatory tendency measures. However, the interaction term between national identification and morality framing was significantly correlated with all reconciliatory tendency measures.6

We then examined the hypothesised structural model as presented in Figure 1, which was created by means of Mplus Version 7.4 with MLR estimator. We used MLR estimator because it is suitable for data containing missing values that violate the assumption of multivariate normality (Muthén & Muthén, 1998–2015).

We used the structural model because of our interest in examining the relations among the latent constructs within the model instead of the relations among the items within the constructs (Little et al., 2002). We generated the latent constructs and their indicators within the first structural model on the basis of item parcelling. The initial step was to run an exploratory factor analysis using oblique rotation to look at the dimensionality of the factor structure of each latent construct (Little et al., 2002). For unidimensional latent constructs, we implemented the item-to-construct balance technique to create item parcels. Using this technique, the highest factor-loading item was combined with the lowest factor-loading item, and the second highest factor-loading item was combined with the second lowest factor-loading item, and so forth (Little et al., 2002). We used the domain representative technique to produce item parcels for multidimensional constructs. We formed the first parcel by joining the first item of all subscales, the second parcel by joining the second item of all subscales, and so forth (Kishton & Widaman, 1994).7

The hypothesised structural model had acceptable goodness of fit to the data, root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) = .07, 90% confidence interval (CI) [0.05, 0.08], comparative fit index (CFI) = .94, Tucker–Lewis index (TLI) = .93 (for criteria for goodness of fit, see Hu & Bentler, 1999).8 As shown in Figure 1, morality framing significantly interacted with national identification to predict positive intergroup orientations ($\beta = .19, SE = 0.08, p = .022, 95\% CI [0.03, 0.36]$; power = .81) and collective emotions ($\beta = .20, SE = 0.08, p = .015, 95\% CI [0.04, 0.36]$; power = .85).9

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>$M$</th>
<th>$SD$</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National identification</td>
<td>4.44</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>− .13</td>
<td>.23**</td>
<td>.35**</td>
<td>.25**</td>
<td>.37**</td>
<td>.17*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morality framing (a violation of moral obligations = 1, a violation of moral ideals = 2)</td>
<td>1.49</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>− .01</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>− .10</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Identification x Morality Framing</td>
<td>6.56</td>
<td>2.27</td>
<td>− .24**</td>
<td>.24**</td>
<td>.24**</td>
<td>.15*</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Positive intergroup orientations</td>
<td>3.87</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>− .39**</td>
<td>.61**</td>
<td>.52**</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Collective emotions</td>
<td>3.92</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>− .51**</td>
<td>.43**</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Reconciliatory attitudes</td>
<td>3.95</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>− .56**</td>
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<tr>
<td>Reconciliatory intentions</td>
<td>4.10</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>−</td>
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Note. Positive intergroup orientations, collective emotions, reconciliatory attitudes, and reconciliatory intentions were calculated by averaging the composite scores of each of the constructs. The composite scores were obtained by summing the observed scores from each subscale within the constructs. Morality framing and national identification were mean-centred.
Figure 1. Results of the hypothesised structural model examining the interaction effect of morality framing (moral obligations vs. moral ideals) and national identification on positive intergroup orientations and collective emotions.

Note. Numbers in the model are standardised path coefficients. The rectangles represent the observed variables, whereas the circles represent the latent variables. Morality framing and national identification were mean-centred. A correlation between the parallel mediators is not displayed for figure simplicity (correlation between positive intergroup orientations and collective emotions: $\beta = .33, p = .001$). $ns$ = not significant.

*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001.

Figure 2 presents the results of multigroup SEM analysis in which the relationships among variables within the hypothesised structural model were differentiated into high and low national identifiers. As presented in Figure 3a, probing analyses revealed that, among participants high in national identification, morality framing positively predicted positive intergroup orientations ($\beta = .28, SE = 0.10, p = .004$, 95% CI [0.09, 0.48]; power = .93). Among participants low in national identification, morality framing negatively predicted positive intergroup orientations ($\beta = -.30, SE = 0.09, p = .002$, 95% CI [-0.48, -0.11]; power = .93, Wald test$[1] = 13.52, p < .001$). In a similar vein, as shown in Figure 3b, among participants high in national identification, morality framing positively predicted collective emotions ($\beta = .23, SE = 0.11, p = .036$, 95% CI [0.02, 0.44]; power = .89), whereas morality framing negatively predicted collective emotions among participants low in national identification ($\beta = -.32, SE = 0.09, p < .001$, 95% CI [-0.49, -0.14]; power = .91, Wald test$[1] = 11.73, p < .001$). These findings therefore are consistent with the correlation analyses reported in the previous section. Moreover, they corroborate Hypothesis 1a, in demonstrating that among high national identifiers, the moral ideals violation framing was more conducive to promoting positive intergroup orientations and collective emotions than the moral obligations violation framing. But among low national identifiers, in support of Hypothesis 1b, the pattern was
reversed such that the moral obligations violation framing was more effective than the moral ideals violation framing in promoting positive intergroup orientations and collective emotions.

Positive intergroup orientations in the hypothesised structural model, as shown in Figure 1, positively predicted reconciliatory attitudes ($\beta = .59, SE = 0.08, p < .001, 95\% CI [0.44, 0.75]; power = 1.00$), and collective emotions did too ($\beta = .32, SE = 0.10, p < .001, 95\% CI [0.15, 0.49]; power = 1.00$). Reconciliatory attitudes, in turn, were a positive predictor of reconciliatory intentions ($\beta = .69, SE = 0.06, p < .001, 95\% CI [0.57, 0.81]; power = 1.00$). Within these relationships, reconciliatory attitudes significantly mediated the role of positive intergroup orientations (indirect effect: $\beta = .41, SE = 0.07, p < .001, 95\% CI [0.27, 0.55]; power = 1.00$) and collective emotions (indirect effect: $\beta = .22, SE = 0.06, p < .001, 95\% CI [0.10, 0.35]; power = 1.00$) in positively predicting reconciliatory intentions. These results corroborate Hypotheses 2a and 2b.

Figure 2. Results of a multigroup SEM model on the relationships among variables within the hypothesised structural model for participants low in national identification (below the median) and high in national identification (above the median).

Note. Numbers in the model are standardised path coefficients. The rectangles represent the observed variables, whereas the circles represent the latent variables. Morality framing and national identification were mean-centred. A correlation between the parallel mediators is not displayed for figure simplicity (correlation between positive intergroup orientations and collective emotions for low national identifiers: $\beta = .39, p < .001$; for high national identifiers: $\beta = .19, p = .256$).

*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
Additional Analyses

For exploratory purposes, we also conducted additional analyses in which we compared the control condition with the moral ideals violation condition and the moral obligations violation condition. The results revealed that both the moral ideals violation condition (see Figure 4 in Supplemental Materials 2) and moral obligations violation condition (see Figure 6 in Supplemental Materials 2) resulted in more positive intergroup orientations and collective emotions compared to the control condition. Moreover, among high national identifiers, but not among low national identifiers, the moral ideals violation condition resulted in positive intergroup orientations (see Figure 5a in Supplemental Materials 2) and collective emotions (see Figure 5b in Supplemental Materials 2) that are significantly higher than those in the control condition. Finally, for both low and high national identifiers, the moral obligations violation condition resulted in significantly higher levels of positive intergroup orientations (see Figure 7a in Supplemental Materials 2) and collective emotions (see Figure 7b in Supplemental Materials 2) compared to the control condition.11

Discussion

Separatist conflict is dubbed as one of the most intractable and violent types of intergroup conflict (Walter, 2009). Developing social interventions that promote reconciliatory attitudes and intentions is therefore of great importance. To this end, the present work examined the effectiveness of a documentary film that reminded viewers of wrongdoings committed by their own majority group against the separatist group. A documentary film is a cost-effective tool that has the potential of reaching a large audience. By inducing participants to construe the wrongdoings committed by their majority ingroup against the separatist group as either a violation of moral ideals (i.e., achieving the ideals of promoting peace and reconciliation) or as a violation of moral obligations (i.e., meeting the obligations of promoting peace and reconciliation), we found that a moral ideals violation framing was more conducive to promoting reconciliatory attitudes and intentions than a moral obligations violation framing, but only for those highly identified with their parent nation. For low identifiers, a moral obligations violation framing appeared more promising than a moral ideals violation framing.
Theoretical Implications

When persuaded by means of a moral ideals violation framing, high-identifying participants expressed more reconciliatory attitudes and intentions. These findings are noteworthy, given that high identifiers are often found to deny historical wrongdoings of their group and report less collective guilt for these wrongdoings (Klein et al., 2011; Zebel et al., 2009). A moral ideals violation framing is thus particularly promising, as it may help circumvent high identifiers’ defensive reactions by rendering ingroup wrongdoings less aversive and thus easier to face. Low identifiers, who do not consider their group as pivotal for their self-definition, more readily accept aversive information about their group, which renders a moral obligations violation framing effective in promoting reconciliatory attitudes and intentions among this group.

The framing of prior ingroup transgressions as a violation of either moral ideals or moral obligations in order to promote peace bears resemblance to the concepts of positive and negative peace as coined by Galtung and Fischer (2013). According to Galtung and Fischer, positive peace denotes efforts to build rapport and restore social justice among parties in conflict. Positive peace hence is approach-oriented, which aligns it with a moral ideals violation frame. Negative peace, meanwhile, manifests in the absence of violence. As such, negative peace is characterised more so by avoidance orientation rather than approach orientation, which aligns it with a moral obligations violation framing. The results from the current study suggest that majority members high in national identification are more susceptible to appeals to positive peace than low identifiers. Low national identifiers, on the other hand, may be more receptive to the concept of negative peace.

National identification in the current study was positively related to the majority’s reconciliatory tendencies towards the separatist group (see Table 1). This finding may appear counterintuitive. The ingroup projection model (IPM; Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999) posits that group members view the norms of their ingroup as more representative for the shared, superordinate identity than those of the outgroup. This sense of ingroup prototypicality results in negative attitudes towards the outgroup, especially among high group identifiers (van Leeuwen et al., 2003). Indeed, acculturation research found that a separation strategy in which the minority aspires to preserve its original culture, triggered negative affective responses among members of the majority subgroup (van Oudenhoven et al., 1998). However, Kanazayire et al. (2014) argued that, in a context in which the majority group clearly dominates the minority group, the majority group views the superordinate group as a mere extension of its own (sub)group. The strong power asymmetry renders deviant subgroups inconsequential to the superordinate identity. Previous research demonstrated that, under such circumstances, majority members who strongly identify with the superordinate identity are positively predisposed towards reconciling with the minority group (e.g., Kanazayire et al., 2014; Noor et al., 2008). The findings in the current research are in line with this literature, and suggest that a strong superordinate identity can foster reconciliatory tendencies among members of a majority subgroup as long as their position of power and dominance over a deviant minority subgroup is secure.

We also found in this research that, when confronted with a moral obligations violation framing, low national identifiers reported more positive intergroup orientations and collective emotions of guilt and shame than high national identifiers. Although low identifiers may still self-categorise as members of the ingroup, and are still implicated by the ingroup’s actions, they see themselves as peripheral instead of as central members. As a result, low identifiers derive little identity from their group, which includes feelings of pride (Jetten et al., 2003). This notion also implies that low identifiers are less interested in seeking pride in their group, which would make them less responsive to a focus on moral ideals. In contrast, a moral obligations framing appeals to feelings of guilt, which low identifiers are
highly motivated to restore. For example, van Leeuwen et al. (2013) found that, among low identifiers, an appeal to feelings of collective guilt significantly affected reconciliatory tendencies (i.e., outgroup helping), whereas an appeal to feelings of collective pride did not affect these tendencies. The current results are in line with these findings in showing that, for low national identifiers, a moral ideals framing was less successful than a moral obligations framing in motivating the majority to reconcile with the separatist group.

The additional analyses in our work demonstrated that, relative to the control condition, the moral ideals violation condition and the moral obligations violation condition were more effective in fostering the majority’s positive intergroup orientations and collective emotions of guilt and shame. These observations imply that moral appeals as reflected in a moral ideals or moral obligations persuasion serve as a potent catalyst for the promotion of reconciliation among members of the dominant, perpetrating group. Indeed, previous work (Bergsieker et al., 2010; Vorauer et al., 1998) suggests that, given its infractions against the victim group, the perpetrating group is typically motivated to be seen as moral, as opposed to the victim group which is more motivated to be seen as powerful and competent. This desire to appear moral, according to Nadler and Shnabel (2015), is a potent catalyst for the perpetrating group’s support for reconciliation with the victim group.

Reconciliation is a multidimensional construct, consisting not only of attitudes but also intentions or behavioural tendencies (Nadler et al., 2008; Stephan, 2008). The current study showed that morality framing and national identification combined in predicting positive intergroup orientations and collective emotions, but not reconciliatory attitudes and intentions. Positive intergroup orientations and collective emotions signify an expression of opinions and feelings, which might be less costly than the concrete actions implied by reconciliatory attitudes and intentions. People are reluctant to support reparations when they view these actions as very costly (Cikara et al., 2011; Schmitt et al., 2008), be it in an immaterial form (e.g., an acknowledgement of the illegitimacy of outgroup harm) or a material form (e.g., financial compensations). Resistance to reparations is often more pronounced among high identifiers, who are more inclined to construe reparations as a threat to their social identity, and thus perceive them as costly (Doosje et al., 2006; Klein et al., 2011). The current findings suggest that, among high identifiers, a moral ideals violation framing might reduce the perceived costs of expressing reconciliatory attitudes and intentions, and promote a focus on the perceived benefits of reconciliatory initiatives as a means to boost the ingroup’s moral image.

Limitations and Future Directions

The current research is not without limitations. Reconciliation in separatist conflict depends not only on the majority’s attitudes, intentions, and actions, but also on those of the separatist group (Walter, 2006). The intervention program in the current study focused on promoting a reconciliatory stance among members of the majority. Other research (Mashuri & van Leeuwen, 2018) has investigated factors that affect separatist groups’ willingness to reconcile. However, to the best of our knowledge, no prior research has investigated how reconciliation in separatist conflict is affected by the interplay between both groups. Opinions or actions by the separatist group could present a serious hurdle for benign intentions among the majority group, and vice versa. For example, the needs-based model of reconciliation (Shnabel et al., 2009) posits that the willingness of a perpetrating group to acknowledge its wrongdoings can satisfy the victim group’s need for empowerment, which in turn bolsters its favourable stances towards reconciliation. However, expressions of responsibility (Nadler & Liviatan, 2006) or the offer of an apology (Philpot & Hornsey, 2008) can be futile when victim groups’ demands focus on realistic reparations such as financial compensations or punishment of perpetrators (Brooks, 1999). Wohl,
Hornsey, and Philpot (2011) suggested that, to promote trust, a perpetrator group should not only acknowledge its wrongdoings and offer an apology, but also engage in concrete actions to amend the harm it inflicted upon the victim group. If the perpetrator's apology is rejected by the victim group, the former group's support for making reparations to the victim group diminishes (Harth et al., 2011). Future research could investigate under which circumstances reconciliatory initiatives by either party are more likely to be met with a positive response among members of the opposite party (Shnabel et al., 2009).

Second, in the present work, the manipulation of morality framing involved a documentary featuring the leader of the participants' organisation, and participants were asked to write down actions that would meet either moral ideals or moral obligations. This procedure may provide participants with more concrete notions of moral ideals violations or moral obligations violations, but may also be criticised on the basis that it is vulnerable to demand characteristics (Nichols & Maner, 2008). Within the context of the current research, this would mean that participants listed their actions out of compliance with the leader's or experimenter's expectations instead of reflecting their genuine thoughts and feelings. To verify this likelihood, future studies could assess the degree to which participants are aware of the research hypotheses. Demand characteristics are highly likely when participants' awareness of the hypotheses strongly correlates with key variables on which the experimental manipulation has a significant effect, and vice versa (Rubin, 2016).

Another limitation is that the current study employed a convenience sample of female participants. Although previous research did not show any differences in men's and women's interpretations of reconciliatory processes in dealing with their own group's wrongdoings (Mashuri, van Leeuwen, & Hanurawan, 2018; Mashuri, van Leeuwen, & van Vugt, 2018), we still need to exert some caution in generalising the current findings to both genders. Furthermore, participants in the current study were assigned to their respective conditions via a method of group randomisation (i.e., organisation branches), meaning that each participant did not have the same probability to be assigned to one of the two conditions. Although no meaningful differences exist between the organisation branches that may be considered relevant to the current study, future research should employ individual randomisation as assignment method.

The final limitation concerns the fact that participants in our research were all members of a nonpolitical mass organisation. Consequently, some caution is in order when generalising the current findings to politicised groups. Separatist conflict is typically a political issue in which separatist groups aim to increase their power vis-à-vis the majority (Saideman, 2001). Politicised groups may differ from nonpolitised groups on how they respond to morality framing. Future research should therefore examine the effect of morality framing among politicised samples.

Practical Implication

The current study offers valuable insights for the use of a documentary film as an intervention tool. A documentary is a potentially practical and cost-effective tool, given that video materials are easily distributed via formal (e.g., national television) and informal (e.g., social media) channels, and have the potential to reach a wide audience (Clement et al., 2013). However, documentaries as part of an intervention package might also be criticised on the basis of their feasibility as well as their selectivity. Local or national governments may prohibit the broadcasting or distribution of a documentary when it features a politically sensitive topic. But even when a documentary is not prohibited, it may only reach a limited audience. Since the viewing of the video material is usually voluntary, it may only reach people who are already receptive to its message—a form of “preaching to the choir.” When employing a documentary film as part of an intervention program, practitioners should therefore be attentive to both the possibility that the material could be banned as well as to the self-selective potential of the material.
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Supplemental material

Supplemental material for this article is available online.

Notes

1. Six participants were excluded from analyses as they failed to describe the central message of the documentary.
2. Inspection of between-subjects ANOVA shows that the distribution of participants’ age across the two branches was not statistically different, $F(1, 157) = 2.38, p = .068$. In order to protect participants’ anonymity, other demographic information was not obtained given the sensitivity of the topic within the current Indonesian context.
3. The documentary was pretested in a pilot study ($N = 10$). Participants perceived the documentary as realistic and credible, and reported that the government’s actions as described in the documentary were harmful to West Papuans. Participants also were satisfied with the duration of the film and the general quality of it (the resolution, the stories). Importantly, the film was perceived as not too sensitive and as not risky to watch (which is important, given the political sensitivity of the topic).
4. We also assessed avoidance regulatory focus (nine items; $\alpha = .41$) and approach regulatory focus (nine items; $\alpha = .69$). Data are available upon request.
5. We also found that morality framing did not significantly affect either the number of uncategorised responses—in the moral ideals violation condition: $M = 0.28, SD = 0.63$; in the moral obligations violation condition: $M = 0.26, SD = 0.82, F(1, 207) = 0.02, p = .879$—or the percentage of participants who reported an uncategorised response: in the moral ideals violation condition: 9.6%; in the moral obligations violation condition: 6.3%; Pearson $\chi^2 (1, 208) = 2.18, p = .183$.
6. Intercorrelations among observed variables within the hypothesised structural model are presented in Table 2 in the Supplemental Materials 1, whereas intercorrelations among latent variables within the hypothesised structural model are presented in Table 3 in the Supplemental Materials 1.
7. Following Sterba and MacCallum (2010), the parcelling models used to create the hypothesised structural model were compared to the other eight parcelling models. The results demonstrate that the structural parameters of our parcelling models (see the label “Model 1” under Table 4 in the Supplemental Materials 1) were consistent with those of the other eight parcelling models and the average model (see the label “Average model” under Table 4 in the Supplemental Materials 1). We also obtained similar results regarding the structural parameters of moderation analyses for the hypothesised structural model (see Tables 5 and 6 in the Supplemental Materials 1).
8. Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) demonstrated that the chi-square of the hypothesised four-factor measurement model (positive intergroup orientations, collective emotions, reconciliatory attitudes, reconciliatory intentions) $\chi^2 (59) = 97.31$, was significantly smaller than that of the alternative, one-factor measurement model (all item parcels were specified to load on a single, overarching factor), $\chi^2 (65) = 520.86 \Delta \chi^2 (6) = -423.55, p < .001$ (the table of chi-square difference was based on Field [2009]). The hypothesised measurement model also fits the data well, RMSEA = .06, 90% CI [0.04, 0.08], CFI = .97, TLI = .96. These results imply that the construct validity of the hypothesised measurement model in the current research is satisfying, denoting that the item parcels highly load on their corresponding construct and lowly load on their unrelated constructs.
9. Power analysis in this structural model was conducted on the basis of Monte Carlo simulation with 10,000 replications, using Mplus Version 7.4 (Muthén & Muthén, 1998–2015).
10. Following Iacobucci et al. (2015), the probing analysis was done by dichotomising national identification by means of median split into two categories: high (above the median) and low (below the median). The next step was to test the assumption of measurement invariance for national identification by comparing two models (Wang & Wang, 2012). The first model was specified by freeing all parameters across the two categories, whereas the
second model was specified by equalling factor loadings across the two categories. The assumption of measurement invariance is met if the $\Delta$CFI between the first model and the second model is no more than .01. The results revealed that the CFI of the first model was .951, whereas the CFI of the second model was .948 ($\Delta$CFI = .00).

11. We also conducted an exploratory analysis in which the moral ideals violation condition and the moral obligations condition were combined into a reminder of ingroup wrongdoings ($n = 208$), and compared this condition with the control condition ($n = 108$). Figure 8 in Supplemental Materials 3A presents the results of such exploratory analysis in more detail.

12. We also analysed an alternative, nested model by adding paths from the interaction term (National Identification x Morality Framing) to reconciliation attitudes and intentions (see Figure 9 in the Supplemental Materials 3B). The chi-square of this model, $\chi^2 (92) = 176.84$, was not significantly smaller than that of the hypothesised model, $\chi^2 (94) = 177.48$, $\Delta \chi^2 (2) = -0.64$, $p > .05$. This result suggests that the hypothesised model is more parsimonious than the alternative model in explaining the data, implying that the nonsignificant additional paths were not warranted. What can be derived from this finding is that, despite the significant positive correlations between the interaction term and each of the measures on reconciliatory tendencies as presented in Table 1, the effects of the interaction term on reconciliatory attitudes and intentions were not significant after taking into account those effects on positive intergroup orientations and collective emotions.

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